Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 1

Article 12

1997

Alleged "Kickbacks" Do Not Violate RICO
Philip J. Tortorich

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Philip J. Tortorich Alleged "Kickbacks" Do Not Violate RICO, 9 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 27 (1997).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol9/iss1/12

This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Proposalto Extend the Little FTCActs to Small Businesses, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1634 (1983). Thus, the
DTPA applies to commercial transactions of businesses
of all sizes. Id. at 1636. The reasoning behind this policy
is that transactions involving wholesalers and retailers
have elements of both consumer and business transactions. Id. at 1631. For example, small businesses often
deal with the same suppliers that serve consumers, and
the boundary between consumer goods and business
purchases is not always clear. Id. Therefore, Texas
recognizes that small businesses can be consumers;
however, this classification only exists if the business
acquires goods or services. Id.

The Griffiths did not acquire any goods or services
and, therefore, did not fit the classification of "consumer." The appellate court looked to Penningtonand
determined that any misrepresentation by Levi, to be
actionable, must pertain to the goods or services that the
Griffiths acquired from Levi. In this case, the Griffiths
sold their services as retailers to Levi; however, they
acquired nothing from Levi. Therefore, the Griffiths did
not fall within the scope of protection under the DTPA.
In conclusion, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the district court in dismissing the complaint and holding that the Griffiths' were not entitled to
recovery on any claim.

Alleged "kickbacks" do not violate RICO
by PhilipJ. Tortorich
Recently, the Northern District of
Illinois held that Mercury Finance
Co. did not violate the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") when it bought a
finance contract at a lower rate than
indicated to the customer. Perino v.
Mercury FinanceCo., 912 F. Supp.
313 (N. D. Ill. 1995).
On May 20, 1993, Joseph Perino
("Perino") purchased a car from
Mancari Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.
("Mancari"). Mancari arranged
financing for Perino with Mercury
Finance Company ("MFC"). Perino
was inforfmed that the annual
percentage rate ("APR") from MFC
was 41.04%. After Perino signed the
contract, MFC purchased the
contract from Mancari at a lower
rate than that quoted to Perino. The
two companies split the difference
between the two rates; for example,
if MFC purchased the contract back
("buy rate") from Mancari for
roughly 30%, then MFC and
Mancari would split the 10%
difference between the APR and the
1997

buy rate. Neither MFC nor Mancari
disclosed this discounted transaction
to Perino. About a year after signing,
Perino became disabled and unable
to make regular payments on the
installment contract. A few months
later, MFC repossessed Perino's car
even though Perino attempted to
make payments through his disability insurance. Consequently, Perino
filed a complaint in federal court
which alleged that MFC violated
RICO and the mail fraud statute
along with several other state law
claims. MFC moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause
of action.

RICO claim dismissed
The heart of Perino's claim was
that MFC adopted a policy of
entering into "secret agreements"
with Mancari and other dealers in
which: (1) MFC purchased retail
installment contracts at a rate less
than the rate at which the purchaser
had originally signed; (2) MFC

allowed the dealers to charge their
customers more than MFC's interest
rates to the dealers; (3) MFC and the
dealers would split the difference;
and (4) the dealers' customers would
not be told that the dealers kept the
difference. Perino contended that
MFC's "kickback" scheme violated
RICO. The court disagreed.
The court held that the
defendant's conduct was neither
fraudulent nor an illegal "kickback."
Perino's allegations focused on the
fact that MFC never disclosed the
activity to the customer. The court
noted that disclosure issues are
resolved under the Truth-in-Lending
Act ("TILA"), which does not
require disclosures of the sort
alleged. The TILA only requires that
a customer be informed of: (1) the
name of the creditor, (2) the amount
financed; and (3) the APR. MFC
fulfilled all of the required disclosures. Furthermore, the court held
that the discounted sale was specifically authorized by, and in compliance with, the TLA.
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In reaching its decision, the court
discussed Balentine v. Union
MortgageCo., No. 91 C 8213, 1994
WL 34256 (N.D. Ill. 1994). In
Balentine, the plaintiff brought an
action for fraud under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act, alleging that
the defendant unlawfully engaged in
the purchase of retail installment
contracts from a home improvement
dealer at 15 - 40 % less
than their face value. This
discount was not disclosed to the consumer.
Inf
The court held that the
defendant's actions
R]
complied with the TILA.
According to Balentine,
In
this discount was not a
finance charge, but rather
of
a "cost of doing business."
pe
Similarly, the
discount offered by MFC
was a "cost of doing
business." Because a
"cost of doing business" is not
required to be disclosed, MFC did
not violate the TILA. Therefore, the
court dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint for failure to state a claim
because MFC's action did not
violate the TILA. After the dismissal
of the federal cause of action, the
court lacked the necessary independent jurisdiction to rule on the state
law claims. Therefore, the court
dismissed the state law claims as
well.

amend the decision, dismissing his
complaint and requesting leave to
file a second amended complaint to
demonstrate that MFC's conduct
violated Illinois law. Perino argued
that the first amended complaint did
not adequately convey to the court
the fact that Mancari acted as an
agent of Perino in obtaining the
financing. Perino contended that
MFC forced Mancari to breach the

allegation of any predicate act.
Furthermore, mail fraud requires
that a plaintiff establish that the
defendant (1) participated in a
scheme to defraud and (2) mailed or
knowingly caused to be mailed a
letter or other material for the
purpose of executing the scheme.
According to the court, Perino failed
to meet the requirements of both the
RICO and the mail fraud claims
because Perino failed
to allege any scheme
to defraud. Perino's
allegations focused
on the fact that MFC
did not disclose the
"kickback" to him.
Since MFC did not
t
violate the TILA, this
argument could not
stand without a
scheme to defraud.
Thus, Perino could
not succeed on either
the RICO or the mail
fraud cause of action.
Further, assuming Perino could
establish a cause of action for fraud,
the court held that the charge of
commercial bribery would not
constitute racketeering activity. In
Illinois, commercial bribery carries a
maximum fine of $5,000. In order to
constitute racketeering activity, the
state offense must be punishable by
imprisonment for more than one
year. However, commercial bribery
is not punishable by more than one
year imprisonment. Thus, the court
concluded that a RICO violation was
not triggered. In light of these
reasons, the court denied Perino's
motion to alter or amend the
judgment.

order to establish a
CO claim, a plaintiff
ust establish "conduc
an enterprise throug 1i a
ittern of racketeering
ac tivity."

Motion to alter or amend
the judgment
After the court granted MFC's
motion for summary judgment,
Perino filed a motion to alter or
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duty it owed Perino, because
Mancari acted as Perino's agent,
thus, constituting commercial
bribery. The court stated, however,
that even upon a review of the
second amended complaint, a cause
of action against MFC for violating
RICO or the mail fraud statute
would not be found because the
claim did not fulfill the minimum
pleading requirements.
In order to establish a RICO
claim, a plaintiff must establish
"conduct of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity.'
"Racketeering activity" requires that
at least two predicate acts be
committed within a ten year period.
While mail fraud is considered a
predicate act, Perino made no
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